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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The principal issue on appeal is whether a self-funded 
employee benefit plan which purchases stop-loss insurance 
from a third party insurance provider is subject to 
Pennsylvania laws governing the enforcement of anti- 
subrogation clauses in insurance contracts. W e join our 
sister circuits in holding a self-funded employee benefit 
plan with stop-loss insurance is not deemed an insurance 
provider under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
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Act. Therefore, the plan is not subject to state laws 
regulating insurance contracts. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
Bill Gray Enterprises, Incorporated Employee Health and 
Welfare Plan, a self-funded welfar e plan operated and 
administered by plaintiff Bill Gray Enterprises, Inc., is a 
welfare benefit plan within the meaning of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. S 1001 
("ERISA"). Funded by contributions from employers and 
covered employees, the Plan is designed, in part, to provide 
medical benefits for catastrophic health car e expenses for 
covered persons and their dependants. The Plan engaged 
Diversified Group Administrator, Inc. to process certain 
claims. It also purchased stop-loss insurance 1 from the 
Insurance Company of North America to cover benefit 
payments exceeding $40,000. Through a subr ogation and 
reimbursement clause in the Plan document, the Plan 
retained rights of subrogation and r eimbursement against 
all Plan participants and third parties for medical benefits 
paid by the Plan. The Plan document's subrogation clause 
provides in part: 
 
       RIGHT OF SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT 
 
       When this provision applies. The Cover ed Person may 
       incur medical or other charges due to Injuries for 
       which benefits are paid by the Plan. The Injuries may 
       be caused by the act or omission of another person. If 
       so, the Covered Person may have a claim against that 
       other person or third party for payment of the medical 
       or other charges. The Plan will be subr ogated to all 
       rights the Covered Person may have against that other 
       person or third party and will be entitled to 
       reimbursement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Insurance Company of North America policy calls this "excess-loss 
insurance." For our purposes here, the ter ms are interchangeable. 
Because most courts describing this type of insurance have called it 
"stop-loss insurance," we will employ that ter m. 
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       The Covered Person must: 
 
       (1) assign or subrogate to the Plan his or her rights 
       to recovery when this provision applies; 
 
       (2) authorize the Plan to sue, compromise and settle 
       in the Covered Person's name to the extent of the 
       amount of medical or other benefits paid for the 
       Injuries under the Plan and its expenses incurr ed by 
       the Plan in collecting this amount; 
 
       (3) reimburse the Plan out of the Recovery made 
       from the other person, the other person's insur er or 
       the third party the amount of medical or other 
       benefits paid for the Injuries under the Plan and the 
       expenses incurred by the Plan in collecting this 
       amount; and 
 
       (4) notify the Plan in writing of any proposed 
       settlement and obtain the Plan's written consent 
       before signing any release or agreeing to any 
       settlement. 
 
       Amount subject to subrogation or r eimbursement. 
       All amounts recovered will be subject to subrogation 
       or reimbursement. In no case will the amount 
       subject to subrogation or reimbursement exceed the 
       amount of medical or other benefits paid for the 
       Injuries under the Plan and the expenses incurr ed 
       by the Plan in collecting this amount. 
 
       When a right of recovery exists, the Cover ed Person 
       will execute and deliver all required instruments and 
       papers, including a subrogation agreement provided 
       by the Plan, as well as doing whatever else is needed, 
       to secure the Plan's rights of subrogation and 
       reimbursement, before any medical or other benefits 
       will be paid by the Plan for the Injuries. If the Plan 
       pays any medical or other benefits for the Injuries 
       before these papers are signed and things are done, 
       the Plan will still be entitled to subrogation and 
       reimbursement. In addition, the Covered Person will 
       do nothing else to prejudice the right of the Plan to 
       subrogate and be reimbursed. 
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       Defined Terms: 
 
       "Recovery" means monies paid to the Cover ed Person 
       by way of judgment, settlement, or otherwise to 
       compensate for all losses caused by, or in connection 
       with, the Injuries. 
 
       "Subrogation" means the Plan's right to pursue the 
       Covered Person's claims for medical or other charges 
       paid by the Plan against the other person, the other 
       person's insurer and the third party. 
 
       "Reimbursement" means repayment to the Plan for 
       medical or other benefits that it has paid towar d care 
       and treatment of the Injury and for the expenses 
       incurred by the Plan in collecting this benefit 
       amount. 
 
       Recovery from another plan under which the 
       Covered Person is covered. This right of 
       reimbursement also applies when a Cover ed Person 
       recovers under an uninsured or underinsur ed 
       motorist plan, homeowner's plan, renter's plan or 
       any liability plan. 
 
B. 
 
On January 23, 1995, defendant Ronald. L. Gourley was 
severely injured when his automobile was struck by an 
uninsured drunk driver operating a stolen vehicle. 
Employed by Massey Buick, GMC, Inc. in Pittsbur gh, Mr. 
Gourley was a participant in the Bill Gray Plan. The Plan, 
through its claims processor Diversified Group 
Administrator, Inc., paid $141, 401.35 to medical providers 
for Mr. Gourley's entire medical expenses. Through its own 
funds, the Plan paid the first $40,000; under the Plan's 
stop-loss policy, the Insurance Company of North America 
provided the Plan the remainder of the funds. 
 
Mr. Gourley sued the tavern that served alcoholic 
beverages to the drunk driver. A jury awar ded him 
$1,182,500 for his injuries and his wife, Judith Gourley, 
$67,500 for loss of consortium. But the taver n did not have 
Dram Shop insurance and filed for bankruptcy after the 
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verdict. It is uncontested that the Gourleys have been 
unable to collect this judgment. 
 
The Gourleys submitted a claim for uninsured motorist 
benefits to their personal automobile insurance carrier, Erie 
Insurance Exchange. After executing a release r epresenting 
that none of the payment was for accident incurr ed medical 
expenses, the Gourleys received $300,000 in uninsured 
motorist benefits, the maximum under their joint policy. 
But prior to payment, the Plan notified the Gourleys and 
Erie Insurance Exchange of its claim for subr ogation and 
reimbursement. Neither the Gourleys nor Erie Insurance 
Exchange reimbursed the Plan by any amount. 
 
C. 
 
Through its fiduciary, Bill Gray Enterprises, the Plan filed 
suit under its subrogation/reimbursement clause to recoup 
the $141, 401.35 in medical benefits it paid Mr . Gourley. 
The Gourleys maintained the Plan was ineligible for 
reimbursement because the Pennsylvania Motor V ehicle 
Financial Responsibility Law bars insurance carriers from 
obtaining reimbursement or subrogation payments in suits 
arising from motor vehicle accidents.2 Contending it was 
not an insurance carrier but a self-funded employee benefit 
plan, the Plan maintained the Pennsylvania Motor V ehicle 
Financial Responsibility Law was preempted by ERISA. 
Furthermore, it argued that under the Plan document's 
unambiguous language, as interpreted by the 
administrator, it was entitled to reimbursement from all 
recoveries obtained from third parties. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor V ehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law provides: 
 
       In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle, 
       there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a 
       claimant's tort recovery with respect to workers' compensation 
       benefits, benefits available under section 1711 (relating to 
required 
       benefits), 1712 (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 
(relating 
       to availability of adequate limits) or benefits paid or payable by 
a 
       program, group contract or other arrangement whether primary or 
       excess under section 1719 (relating to coor dination of benefits). 
 
75 Pa.C.S.A. S 1720 (West 1996). 
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To the extent the Plan had a right to subr ogation, Erie 
Insurance Exchange argued the right was subject to the 
defenses it could raise against the subrogors (the Gourleys). 
Because Erie Insurance Exchange had paid the maximum 
contractual benefits to the Gourleys, it maintained it had a 
complete defense to the Plan's suit. In addition, Mrs. 
Gourley maintained she was not required to reimburse the 
Plan for the uninsured motorist benefits she received under 
her Erie Insurance Exchange policy which jointly covered 
both her and her husband. 
 
The District Court held the Plan was an uninsur ed 
employee benefit plan and under ERISA was not subject to 
the Pennsylvania insurance anti-subrogation law. Because 
the Plan document, as interpreted by the Plan 
administrator, was unambiguous and reasonable, the 
District Court held the Plan was entitled to r eimbursement 
from payments received from thir d parties.3 The District 
Court also held Mrs. Gourley was not covered under the 
Plan document's reimbursement clause and ther efore was 
not personally liable to reimburse the Plan fr om the joint 
benefits received under the Erie Insurance Exchange policy. 
Finally, it held the Plan could not seek payments under its 
subrogation clause from Erie Insurance Exchange because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Plan also sought an award for pr ejudgment interest on the 
amounts it was entitled to receive under the subgrogation/ 
reimbursement clause of the Plan document. The District Court denied 
this award stating that it would be "unfair and inequitable to add any 
pre-judgment interest to the award of $141, 401.35 already imposed on 
Mr. Gourley." Bill Gray Enter., Inc. Employee Health and Welfare Planv. 
Gourley, CA. No. 97-317, slip op. at *3 (W .D. Pa. May 19, 1999) (citing 
Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F .2d 999, 1009 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("The awarding of prejudgment inter est under ERISA is within the 
district court's discretion, `given in r esponse to considerations of 
fairness 
and denied when its exaction would be inequitable.' "). The District Court 
reasoned that Mr. Gourley's refusal to reimburse the Plan was not 
motivated by bad faith nor was it unreasonable in the context of the 
complicated ERISA scheme. Recognizing Mr. Gourley sustained life 
altering injuries, the court held in balancing the equities it would be 
unfair to impose prejudgement interest payments on him. Id. We hold 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion and will affirm. See 
Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1009-10. 
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Erie had already paid its contractually obligated claims 
directly to Mr. Gourley. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1331, and 29 U.S.C. S 1132 (e)(1). We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 
951 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
The ERISA preemption clause, 29 U.S.C. S1144(a), 
provides: 
 
       Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the 
       saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and 
       subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and 
       all State laws insofar as they may now or her eafter 
       relate to any employee benefit plan . . . . 
 
Courts have interpreted ERISA's preemption clause 
broadly, noting Congress' intention to make ERISA "an area 
of exclusive federal concern." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 
U.S. 52, 58 (1990). While ERISA broadly pr eempts state 
regulations of employee benefit plans, it does not preempt 
state laws governing insurance. The ERISA savings clause, 
29 U.S.C. S 1144(b)(2)(A), provides: 
 
       Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer 
       clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed 
       to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any 
       State which regulates insurance, banking, or 
       securities. 
 
The ERISA deemer clause, 29 U.S.C. S 1144(b)(2)(B), 
provides: 
 
       Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust 
       established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be 
 
                                8 
  
       an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust 
       company, or investment company or to be engaged in 
       the business of insurance or banking for purposes of 
       any law or any State purporting to regulate insurance 
       companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust 
       companies, or investment companies. 
 
Noting the relationship between these clauses is not a 
"model of legislative drafting," Metr o. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985), the Supreme 
Court has nonetheless provided guidance in determining 
how to apply these clauses in a manner consistent with 
Congressional intent. In FMC Corp., the Court addressed 
whether S 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor V ehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law4 was applicable to a self-funded ERISA 
health care plan. Holding the health plan was exempt from 
the Pennsylvania Anti-Subrogation law, the Court stated: 
 
       We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded 
       ERISA plans from state laws that "regulat[e] insurance" 
       within the meaning of the savings clause. By forbidding 
       States to deem employee benefit plans "to be an 
       insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be 
       engaged in the business of insurance," the deemer 
       clause relieves plans from state laws"purporting to 
       regulate insurance." As a result, self-funded ERISA 
       plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that 
       regulation "relate[s] to" the plans. State laws directed 
       toward the plans are pre-empted because they relate to 
       an employee benefit plan but are not "saved" because 
       they do not regulate insurance. State laws that directly 
       regulate insurance companies are "saved" but do not 
       reach self-funded employee benefits plans because the 
       plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies 
       . . . . 
 
498 U.S. at 61. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor V ehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law is the same provision that is at issue in this case. 
This section prohibits insurance providers from obtaining reimbursement 
payments from recoveries an insured r eceives from third parties in a 
motor vehicle accident. 
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Although the deemer and savings clauses make clear 
distinctions between employee benefit plans and insurance 
contracts, the Supreme Court noted, 
 
       Employee benefit plans that are insur ed are subject to 
       indirect state insurance regulation. An insurance 
       company that insures a plan remains an insurer for 
       purposes of state laws "purporting to regulate 
       insurance" after the application of the deemer clause. 
       The insurance company is therefore not r elieved from 
       state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is 
       consequently bound by the state insurance regulations 
       insofar as they apply to the plan's insurer . 
 
Id. 
 
Thus the Court concluded, 
 
       Our interpretation of the deemer clause makes clear 
       that if a plan is insured, a State may r egulate it 
       indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its 
       insurer's insurance contracts; if the plan is uninsured, 
       the State may not regulate it. 
 
Id. at 64.5 
 
B. 
 
The precise issue on appeal is whether a self-funded 
employee benefit plan is "insured" when it purchases stop- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Mr. Gourley asserts recent Supr eme Court jurisprudence suggests the 
Court has adopted a more restrictive interpretation of ERISA preemption. 
See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Serv. Fund , 520 U.S. 806 
(1997); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, r eh'g denied, 521 U.S. 1138 
(1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enfor cement v. Dillingham Const., 
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997). We do not interpret these cases as 
signaling a general shift in ERISA preemption, especially in the context 
of insurance coverage. As recently as 1995 in N.Y. State Conference of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 
(1995), the Supreme Court reiterated that ERISA preempts state 
insurance laws as they relate to employee benefit plans. Specifically 
addressing preemption in the context of state insurance regulations, the 
Supreme Court stated, "ERISA preempt[s] state laws that mandate[ ] 
employee benefit structures or their administration." Id. at 658 
(affirming 
FMC Corp., 498 U.S. 52 (1990)). 
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loss insurance. If the purchase of stop-loss coverage makes 
the Plan insured for the purposes of ERISA, the Plan may 
be "indirectly regulated" by state insurance laws. Although 
we have not directly addressed this issue, three courts of 
appeals have held the purchase of stop-loss insurance does 
not make a self-funded employee benefit plan "insured" for 
the purposes of ERISA preemption. Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. 
Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 
936 (1998); Thompson v. Talquin Bldg. Pr od. Co., 928 F.2d 
649 (4th Cir. 1991); Lincoln Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lectron Prod., 
Inc., Employee Health Benefit Plan, 970 F .2d 206 (6th Cir. 
1992); United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers 
Ariz. Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 1986); see also Drexelbr ook Eng'r Co. v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 710 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Pa.), af f 'd., 891 F.2d 280 (3d 
Cir. 1989); Cuttle v. Fed. Employees Metal Trades Council, 
623 F. Supp. 1154 (D.Me. 1985). 
 
We join these courts of appeals and hold the purchase of 
stop-loss insurance does not make a self-funded employee 
benefit plan an insurance carrier under ERISA's"savings 
clause." As other courts have recognized, stop-loss 
insurance is not designed to insure individual plan 
participants but to provide reimbursement to a plan after 
the plan makes benefit payments. Am. Med. Sec., Inc., 111 
F.3d at 361 ("Stop-loss insurance is . . . akin to 
`reinsurance' in that it provides r eimbursement to a plan 
after the plan makes benefit payments."). 
 
Employee benefit plans that purchase stop-loss 
insurance are not insuring plan participants, but insuring 
the plan itself in the event a catastrophic medical event 
requires the plan to pay out large sums to an individual 
participant. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
stated, 
 
       Stop-loss insurance does not pay benefits dir ectly to 
       participants, nor does the insurance company take 
       over administration of the Plan at the point when the 
       aggregate amount is reached. Thus, no insurance is 
       provided to the participants, and the Plan should 
       properly be termed a non-insured plan, protected by 
       the deemer clause . . . . 
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Pacyga, 801 F.2d at 1161-62. 
 
When an ERISA plan purchases stop-loss insurance, it 
retains liability to plan participants for the full extent of 
their injuries. By purchasing stop-loss insurance, the plan 
does not delegate its fiscal liabilities or administrative 
responsibilities to the insurance company. In the event the 
stop-loss insurer or the plan becomes insolvent, the plan 
retains liability to plan participants even to those amounts 
covered under the stop-loss coverage. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit noted the significance of this fact 
stating, "When a plan buys health insurance for 
participants and beneficiaries, the plan participants and 
beneficiaries have a legal claim directly against the 
insurance company, thereby securing benefits even in the 
event of the plan's insolvency." Am. Med. Sec., Inc., 111 
F.3d at 364. 
 
Merely by purchasing stop-loss insurance and at the 
same time retaining financial responsibility for plan 
participants' coverage, self-funded plans may not r ely on 
the assets of an insurance company in the event of 
insolvency. See id. It follows that r eimbursement and 
subrogation rights are vital to ensuring the financial 
stability of self-funded plans. Consistent with other courts 
of appeals, therefore, we hold that when an ERISA plan 
purchases stop-loss insurance but does not otherwise 
delegate its financial responsibilities to another third party 
insurer, it remains an uninsur ed self-funded welfare plan 
for ERISA preemption purposes. Because stop-loss 
insurance is designed to protect self-funded employee 
benefit plans, rather than individual participants, plans 
purchasing stop-loss insurance are not deemed "insured" 
under ERISA. Am. Med. Sec., Inc., 111 F . 3d at 358; 
Pacyga, 801 F.2d at 1162 (self-funded ERISA plan that 
purchases stop-loss insurance "should pr operly be termed 
a non-insured plan, protected by the deemer clause"). But 
we recognize that a self-funded ERISA plan may purchase 
such a large amount of stop-loss insurance that it appears 
as if the plan is no longer operating as a self-funded 
employee benefit plan but rather effectively operating as an 
insurance company. In this instance the purchase of large 
amounts of stop-loss insurance may be evidence that the 
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plan is attempting to retain the financial security provided 
by insurance coverage while at the same time r eap the 
benefits of ERISA preemption, including the avoidance of 
state laws regulating reimbursement. Because there is no 
evidence that the Bill Gray Plan purchased an excessive 
amount of stop-loss insurance, we do not reach the issue 
whether the purchase of large amounts of stop-loss 
insurance effectively makes a self-funded ERISA plan an 
insurance company for ERISA preemption purposes. 
 
Because the Bill Gray Plan purchased stop-loss 
insurance to insure the Plan from losses in the event its 
members suffered catastrophic injury requiring substantial 
medical payments, it is not an insurance provider under 
ERISA. Accordingly the Bill Gray Plan, as an uninsured 
self-funded employee benefit plan,6 is exempt from S 1720 
of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility 
Law. 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
Recognizing the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law does not preclude the Plan from 
enforcing its subrogation and reimbursement provisions, we 
next turn to whether the Plan document unambiguously 
and reasonably requires the Gourleys to reimburse the 
Plan. The Plan document provides, "The Plan Administrator 
shall have discretionary authority to construe and interpret 
the terms and provisions of the Plan . . . and to decide 
disputes which may arise relative to a Plan Participants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Gourleys argue the Plan has admitted that it is not a self-funded 
ERISA Plan because it identified itself as an"insured welfare plan" in its 
1994-1995 federal income tax filings. The District Court found this 
argument "disingenuous" because in the same filings the Plan stated it 
provided "self-funded stop-loss" insurance benefits. The District Court 
stated, "This entire piece of evidence, ther efore, and not just the 
selected 
excerpt taken out of context, actually supports the Plan's position that 
it is a self-funded plan, with stop-loss insurance." Bill Gray Enter., 
Inc., 
slip op. at *30. Having reviewed the tax for ms in question, we agree. 
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rights, and to decide questions of Plan interpr etation and 
those of fact relating to the Plan." 
 
The Supreme Court has directed courts to r eview a self- 
funded ERISA plan's interpretation of its contracts 
governing benefit payments under an arbitrary and 
capricious standard. Firestone T ire and Rubber Co. v. 
Brunch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (holding court must review de 
novo company's denial of benefits unless benefit plan gives 
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to 
construe terms of plan in which case courts r eview a 
benefits denial under an arbitrary and capricious standard).7 
Applying general principles of trust law, the Court stated, 
"if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or 
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that 
conflict must be weighed as a `facto[r] in determining 
whether there is an abuse of discretion.' " Id. at 115 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts  S 187, cmt. d). As 
recently as last year in Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2000), we addressed when 
a self-funded plan operates under a conflict of interest, 
stating, 
 
       Employers typically structure the relationship of ERISA 
       plan administration, interpretation, and funding in one 
       of three ways. First, the employer may fund a plan and 
       pay an independent third party to interpr et the plan 
       and make plan benefits determinations. Second, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In discussing this standard of review, the Court held that it is only 
applicable in actions "challenging denial of benefits based on plan 
interpretations." Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108. It stated, "We express no 
view as to the appropriate standards of r eview for actions under other 
remedial provisions of ERISA." Id. While Firestone does not mandatea 
"mechanical application" of the arbitrary and capricious standard in all 
cases involving ERISA plan interpretation, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard is appropriate in cases that involve analogous principles of 
trust law where a fiduciary is given discr etionary authority to interpret 
the language of a plan document's provisions. See Moench v. Robertson, 
62 F.3d 553, 566 (3d Cir. 1995)(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
S 187 ("Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to 
the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the 
court, 
except to prevent abuse by the trustee of his discretion.")), cert. 
denied, 
516 U.S. 1115 (1996). 
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       employer may establish a plan, ensure its liquidity, 
       and create an internal benefits committee vested with 
       the discretion to interpret the plan's ter ms and 
       administer benefits. Third, the employer may pay an 
       independent insurance company to fund, interpr et, and 
       administer a plan . . . . [W]e have pr eviously held the 
       first two arrangements do not, in themselves, 
       constitute the kind of conflict of interest mentioned in 
       Firestone. 
 
Because the Plan did not pay the Insurance Company of 
North America to fund, interpret or administer the Plan, it 
does not fall under Pinto's third model. As noted, plans 
falling under this third model are generally subject to a 
heightened form of arbitrary and capricious r eview. But 
unless specific evidence of bias or bad-faith has been 
submitted, plans that fall under the other two models are 
reviewed under the traditional arbitrary and capricious 
standard.8 Id. 
 
Reviewing our jurisprudence in the context of self-funded 
ERISA plans we stated, 
 
       While . . . there might be a risk of opportunism [in 
       permitting a self-funded Plan to interpr et the 
       provisions of its coverage] . . . this alone d[oes] not 
       constitute evidence of a conflict of inter est, in part 
       because the employer "ha[s] incentives to avoid the loss 
       of morale and higher wage demands that could r esult 
       from denials of benefits." 
 
Id. at 386 (quoting Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323 (3d Cir. 
1991)). 
 
We explained, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In Pinto, we did not have the opportunity to consider whether other 
plan structures, such as those involving stop-loss insurers, may give rise 
to an inference of bias. Because Gourley has failed to allege bias on the 
part of the plan administrator due to its contractual obligation to the 
Insurance Company of North America to pursue subr ogation remedies, 
and because he has failed to set forth any other evidence of bias in the 
decision making process, we need not consider whether self-interest on 
the part of the administrator mandates a heightened standard of review. 
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       The typical employer-funded pension plan is set up to 
       be actuarially grounded, with the company making 
       fixed contributions to the pension fund, and a 
       provision requiring that the money paid into the fund 
       may be used only for maintaining the fund and paying 
       out pension [benefits] . . . . The employer in such a 
       circumstance "incurs no direct expense as a result of 
       the allowance of benefits, nor does it benefit directly 
       from the denial or discontinuation of benefits." In 
       contrast . . . the typical insurance company is 
       structured such that its profits ar e directly affected by 
       the claims it pays out and those it denies. 
 
Id (internal citation omitted). at 388. 
 
Under the Plan document, Bill Gray, as the Planfiduciary 
and administrator,9 was given the discretionary authority to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Plan document describes Bill Gray's fiduciary responsibilities as 
Plan Administrator as follows: 
 
         DUTIES OF THE PLAN ADMINISTRATOR  
 
       (1)- To administer the Plan in accor dance with its terms. 
 
       (2)- To decide disputes which may arise r elative to a Plan 
       Participant's rights. 
 
       (3)- To keep and maintain the Plan documents and all other 
       records pertaining to the Plan. 
 
       (4)- To appoint a Claims Processor to pay claims. 
 
       (5)- To perform all necessary r eporting as required by ERISA. 
 
       (6)- To establish and communicate pr ocedures to determine 
       whether a medical child support order is qualified under ERISA Sec. 
       609. 
 
The Plan document also states, 
 
       The Plan Administrator shall administer this Plan in accordance 
       with its terms and establish its policies, interpretations, 
practices, 
       and procedures. It is the express intent of this Plan that the Plan 
       Administrator shall have discretionary authority to construe and 
       interpret the terms and provisions of the Plan, to make 
       determinations regarding issues which relate to eligibility for 
       benefits, to decide disputes which may arise r elative to a Plan 
       Participant's rights, and to decide questions of Plan 
interpretation 
       and those of fact relating to the Plan. The decision of the Plan 
       Administrator will be final and binding on all interested parties. 
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interpret the terms of the Plan document. By instituting 
litigation against the Gourleys, Bill Gray interpr eted the 
Plan document to require reimbursement from payments 
received under an uninsured motorist benefits policy.10 
Accordingly, we review the Plan's interpr etation of the Plan 
document under an arbitrary and capricious standar d. 
Pinto, 214 F.3d at 378; see also United McGill Co. v. 
Stinnett, 154 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir . 1998). 
 
B. 
 
ERISA health plans must provide participants with a 
plan document that clearly explains coverage. These plan 
documents must 
 
       be written in a manner calculated to be understood by 
       the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently 
       accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise 
       such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and 
       obligations under the plan. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1022(a). 
 
Whether terms in an ERISA Plan document ar e ambiguous 
is a question of law. A term is "ambiguous if it is subject to 
reasonable alternative interpretations." Taylor v. Cont'l 
Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 
1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1991); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Mr. Gourley argues that courts have de novo review of an ERISA plan 
fiduciary's interpretation of a plan document if the document gives the 
fiduciary the authority to interpret or construe the terms of the plan, 
but 
the fiduciary fails to exercise this authority. Moench, 62 F.3d at 567-68 
(arbitrary and capricious standard is "appr opriate only when the trust 
instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the 
trustee has in fact interpreted the instrument"). He argues that Bill Gray 
failed to "deliberate[ ], discuss[ ], or interpret[ ] the Health Plan's 
Third 
Party Recovery and Subrogation provision in any formal manner prior to 
asserting a subrogation/reimbursement claim against Mr. Gourley." But 
the District Court found that "by the Gourleys' own admission . . . the 
Plan has been intimately involved in negotiations and the exchange of 
respective legal positions [regar ding plan document interpretation] . . . 
and moreover, the Plan has initiated andfiled its complaint under a 
theory which necessarily relies on its interpr etation of the Plan." Bill 
Gray Enter., Inc., slip op. at *22. W e agree. 
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Credit Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980). In 
determining whether a particular clause in a plan 
document is ambiguous, courts must first look to the plain 
language of document. In Re UNISYS Corp. Retir ee Med. 
Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The 
written terms of the plan documents contr ol . . . ."). If the 
plain language of the document is clear, courts must not 
look to other evidence. In re Unisys Corp. Long-Term 
Disability Plan ERISA Litig., 97 F.3d 710, 715 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1013) (" `Our approach 
does not authorize a trial judge to demote the written word 
to a reduced status in contract interpr etation. Although 
extrinsic evidence may be considered under pr oper 
circumstances, the parties remain bound by the 
appropriate objective definition of the wor ds they use to 
express their intent . . . .' ")). But if the plain language leads 
to two reasonable interpretations, courts may look to 
extrinsic evidence to resolve any ambiguities in the plan 
document. However, "it is inappropriate to consider such 
[extrinsic] evidence when no ambiguity exists." Epright v. 
Envtl. Res. Mgmt, Inc. Health and Welfar e Plan; ERM, 81 
F.3d 335, 339 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
To recapitulate, in reviewing a plan administrator's 
interpretation of an ERISA plan we must first examine 
whether the terms of the plan document ar e ambiguous. 
See generally In re Unisys Corp. Long-T erm Disability Plan 
ERISA Litig., 97 F.3d at 715-16. If the terms are 
unambiguous, then any actions taken by the plan 
administrator inconsistent with the terms of the document 
are arbitrary. But actions reasonably consistent with 
unambiguous plan language are not arbitrary. If the 
reviewing court determines the ter ms of a plan document 
are ambiguous, it must take the additional step and 
analyze whether the plan administrator's interpr etation of 
the document is reasonable. Spacek v. Maritime Ass'n ILA 
Pension Plan, 134 F.3d 283, 292 (5th Cir . 1998). In making 
this determination, the level of defer ence the reviewing 
court will accord the plan administrator's interpretation is 
guided by our prior discussion of Pinto. 214 F.3d at 383. 
 
Mr. Gourley asserts the language of the Plan document is 
ambiguous in describing which funds are subject to 
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reimbursement and subrogation; specifically, whether 
reimbursement is required when a covered person receives 
payments that are unrelated to medical costs. Mr. Gourley 
contends the Plan document only requires r eimbursement 
for payments received from a third party for medical 
benefits. He cites the Plan document's definition of the term 
"reimbursement" which provides:"Reimbursement means 
repayment to the Plan for medical or other benefits that it 
has paid toward care and treatment for the Injury and for 
the expenses incurred by the Plan in collecting this benefit 
amount." Because the $300,000 he received fr om Erie 
Insurance Exchange was unrelated to his medical bills, he 
contends it is not subject to reimbursement. 
 
Mr. Gourley also argues the Plan document's designation 
of the term "third party" thr oughout the document is 
ambiguous. Because the Plan does not define "third party," 
he maintains it is unclear whether the term includes his 
own insurance company, in this case Erie Insurance 
Exchange. See Standish v. Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co., 698 A.2d 
599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding ter m "third party" did 
not include an uninsured motorist carrier). He contends the 
Plan could have clarified the "ambiguity" by using the terms 
"covered person's own insurance company" rather than 
"third party" in order to put Plan participants on notice that 
recoveries from private insurance companies were subject 
to subrogation and reimbursement. 
 
The District Court held the Plan document's language 
was not ambiguous. We agree.1 1 The Plan document 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. As noted, the Plan provides: 
 
       When this provision applies. The Cover ed Person may incur 
       medical or other charges due to Injuries for which benefits are 
paid 
       by the Plan. The Injuries may be caused by the act or omission of 
       another person . . . . The Plan will be subr ogated to all rights 
the 
       Covered Person may have against that other person or third party 
       and will be entitled to reimbursement. 
 
       The Covered Person must: 
 
       *   *   * 
 
       (3) reimburse the Plan out of the Recovery made from the other 
       person, the other person's insurer or the thir d party the amount 
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explicitly requires Mr. Gourley to reimburse the Plan for 
any recovery received from a thir d party in relation to the 
accident, stating, "All amounts received will be subject to 
subrogation and reimbursement." A plain reading of this 
provision sets forth the Plan's broad right to subrogation 
and reimbursement. 
 
The term "third party" is not ambiguous because the 
term clearly refers to any person or entity other than the 
Plan and the covered individual. "Thir d party" broadly 
refers to a variety of individuals and entities who are not "a 
party to a lawsuit, agreement, or other transaction." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1489 (7th ed. 1999). As the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       of medical or other benefits paid for the Injuries under the Plan 
       and the expenses incurred by the Plan in collecting this amount. 
 
       *   *   * 
 
       Amount subject to subrogation or reimbursement. All amounts 
       recovered will be subject to subrogation or reimbursement. In no 
       case will the amount subject to subrogation or reimbursement 
       exceed the amount of medical or other benefits paid for the 
       Injuries under the Plan and the expenses incurr ed by the Plan in 
       collecting this amount. 
 
       *   *   * 
 
       Defined Terms: 
 
       "Recovery" means monies paid to the Cover ed Person by way of 
       judgment, settlement, or otherwise to compensate for all losses 
       caused by, or in connection with, the Injuries. 
 
       "Subrogation" means the Plan's right to pursue the Covered 
       Person's claims for medical or other charges paid by the Plan 
       against the other person, the other person's insur er and the third 
       party. 
 
       "Reimbursement" means repayment to the Plan for medical or 
       other benefits that it has paid toward car e and treatment of the 
       Injury and for the expenses incurred by the Plan in collecting this 
       benefit amount. 
 
       Recovery from another plan under which the Covered Person 
       is covered. This right of reimbursement also applies when a 
       Covered Person recovers under an uninsur ed or underinsured 
       motorist plan, homeowner's plan, renter's plan or any liability 
       plan. 
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noted, the term third party "in common parlance refers to 
a person or entity not an initial party to a suit or 
transaction who may have rights or obligations ther ein." Bill 
Gray Enter., Inc., slip op. at *15. While this provision 
contemplates broad rights to reimbursement, we do not 
believe this translates into ambiguity. 
 
Most convincing, however, is the provision in the Plan 
document which provides: 
 
       Recovery from another plan under which the 
       Covered Person is covered. This right of 
       reimbursement also applies when a Cover ed Person 
       recovers under an uninsured or underinsur ed motorist 
       plan, homeowner's plan, renter's plan or any liability 
       plan. 
 
A reasonable plan participant reading this language, we 
believe, would understand the Plan document clearly 
mandates any recoveries from an uninsur ed motorist plan 
are subject to reimbursement.12  The Plan's interpretation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Mr. Gourley contends the District Court erred in denying his 
discovery request to compel the Plan to pr oduce documentation of 
previous claims the Plan administrator may have brought under the 
subrogation/reimbursement clause to r ecover amounts paid by third 
parties to other Plan participants. He contends that prior cases in which 
the Plan interpreted the subrogation/r eimbursement clause to require 
reimbursement from uninsured motorist benefits are relevant to 
examining our standard of review since prior inconsistent interpretations 
may evidence that the Plan failed to exercise its authority to construe 
the 
Plan document in a uniform manner. Mr . Gourley argues that evidence 
of inconsistent interpretations is relevant to determining the 
reasonableness of the Plan's current interpretation. See Moench, 62 F.3d 
at 566 ("whether the [Plan] interpr eted the provision at issue 
consistently" is a factor in determining whether the interpretation is 
reasonable under the arbitrary and capricious standard). The Plan 
argues that previous subrogation/r eimbursement claims the Plan may 
have pursued against other Plan participants ar e irrelevant here because 
the Plan has a fiduciary responsibility to pursue repayment claims. Even 
if in the past the Plan failed to pursue subr ogation/reimbursement 
claims, the Plan contends this does not relieve it of its fiduciary 
responsibility to pursue its current claim against the Gourleys. 
 
In certain cases, the discovery sought here may well be relevant. But 
the Plan's past interpretations have little r elevance to the current 
dispute 
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therefore was not arbitrary and capricious and the District 
Court properly found the Plan was entitled to 
reimbursement from the uninsured motorist benefits Mr. 
Gourley received from Erie Insurance Exchange.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
since the Plan document unambiguously requir es reimbursement from 
uninsured motorist benefits. In r e UNISYS Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit 
"ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d at 902 (citing Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners Inc., 
908 F.2d 115, 116 (3d Cir. 1990) (the unambiguous written provisions of 
a plan must control, and extrinsic evidence may not be introduced to 
vary the express terms of a plan)); Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am., Corp., 
980 F.2d 698, 702 (11th Cir.) ("Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to 
contradict the terms of an unambiguous contract."), reh'g denied, 988 
F.2d 1220 (1993), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 930 (1996). Under these facts, 
we see no abuse of discretion. Because the Plan document 
unambiguously requires reimbursement, the Plan's interpretation is not 
arbitrary or capricious. See Epright, 81 F .3d at 339 ("Extrinsic evidence 
may be used to determine an ambiguous ter m, however, . . . past 
practice is of no significance where the plan document is clear."). 
 
13. Mr. Gourley has asked us to for mulate a rule as a matter of federal 
common law that a plan participant has no duty to r eimburse a plan 
until that person has been "made whole," i.e. been fully compensated for 
all injuries sustained. He contends other courts of appeals have adopted 
this policy in construing ambiguous provisions in benefit plan 
documents. See Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc., Gr oup Benefits Plan for Salaried 
& Non-Bargaining Hourly Employees v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1996); Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Assoc. of Cal. Health and 
Welfare Benefit Plan, 64 F.3d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1995). But courts 
have held that importing federal common law doctrines to ERISA plan 
interpretation is generally inappropriate, particularly when the terms of 
an ERISA plan are clear and unambiguous. Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 
F.3d 113, 117 n.3 (3d Cir.) (citing authorities), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
952 
(1997); see also Ryan by Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123 
(3d Cir. 1996); Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir.) 
("Because the make whole doctrine is a default rule, the parties can 
contract out of the doctrine."), reh'g denied en banc, 124 F.3d 223 
(1997); Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir.) 
("Because . . . the make whole rule is just a principle of interpretation, 
it can be overridden by clear language in the plan."), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 916 (1993); Walker v. Rose, 22 F . Supp.2d 343, 352 (D.N.J. 1998) 
("This Court finds that the Plan's reimbursement language is 
unambiguous, and . . . overrides the make whole rule."). As the Supreme 
Court stated in Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993), 
"The authority of courts to develop a `federal common law' under ERISA 
. . . is not the authority to revise the text of the statute." In Ryan, 78 
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C. 
 
The District Court held Mrs. Gourley was not personally 
liable to reimburse the Plan for the $141,401.35 in medical 
benefits the Plan paid to Mr. Gourley fr om the $300,000 of 
uninsured motorist benefits jointly r eceived under the Erie 
Insurance Exchange policy. Although it found Mrs. Gourley 
was a "covered person" under the Plan, the Court noted she 
did not sustain injuries nor receive payments from the Plan 
for personal medical expenses. Under the ter ms of the Plan 
document, the Plan was not entitled to reimbursement for 
payments Mrs. Gourley received from thir d parties since 
the Plan expended no payments on her behalf.14 The Plan 
counters that Mrs. Gourley, as a plan participant, is 
"obligated to do nothing . . . to prejudice the right of the 
Plan to subrogate and be reimbursed," and therefore the 
Plan is entitled to receive the uninsur ed motorist benefits 
Mrs. Gourley received in relation to her husband's accident. 
See Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1255. But a plain reading of the 
Plan document does not permit the Plan to seek 
reimbursement from a party for whom it never expended 
funds under its medical coverage. Mrs. Gourley r eceived no 
payments from the Plan for personal injuries. Therefore, we 
find the District Court properly exer cised its discretion in 
finding the Plan's interpretation was arbitrary and 
capricious because the Plan document unambiguously 
limits recovery to individuals for whom the Plan has 
expended funds. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
F.3d at 126, we therefore stated,"straightforward language . . . [in an 
ERISA plan document] should be given its natural meaning." 
 
Because we find the terms at issue in this case unambiguously require 
Mr. Gourley to reimburse the Plan with the proceeds of his uninsured 
motorist benefits, we decline to extend the make whole remedy to his 
claim. 
 
14. The specific Plan provision in question provides: 
 
       When this provision applies. The Cover ed Person may incur 
       medical or other charges due to Injuries for which benefits are 
paid 
       for by the Plan. . . . The Plan will be subr ogated to all rights 
the 
       Covered Person may have against . . . other person[s] or third 
       part[ies] and will be entitled to reimbursement. 
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D. 
 
The Plan contends Erie Insurance Exchange is liable 
under the subrogation/reimbursement clause to reimburse 
the Plan for the medical benefits the Plan paid to medical 
providers from the proceeds of the Gourleys' uninsured 
motorist policy. Because Erie Insurance Exchange was on 
notice of the Plan's right to subrogation, the Plan maintains 
it should have paid the uninsured motorist pr oceeds 
directly to them. The District Court held Erie Insurance 
Exchange was not obligated to reimburse the Plan for the 
uninsured motorist benefits it paid to the Gourleys. We 
agree. 
 
Erie Insurance Exchange was under contract with the 
Gourleys to pay up to $300,000 in uninsured motorist 
benefits. But Erie Insurance Exchange was not a party to 
the contract between the Plan and the Gourleys. Erie 
Insurance Exchange argues that its lack of a contractual 
relationship with the Plan defeats any dir ect claim by the 
Plan against it. See Cent. States, SE & SW Ar eas Health & 
Welfare Fund v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur. Co., 17 F.3d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1994). But the lack of a contractual 
obligation between a third party insurer to an ERISA plan 
does not bar suit by an ERISA plan when subr ogation 
rights are at issue. 
 
Erie Insurance Exchange also contends that under 
equitable principles of subrogation, it may pr operly assert 
payment in full as a defense to the Plan's suit, since it paid 
the entire amount of the uninsured motorist policy to the 
Gourleys. We agree. Subrogation is an equitable remedy. 
Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1088 
(3d Cir. 1996). When a subrogee [the Plan] sues a third 
party [Erie Insurance Exchange], it [the Plan] steps into the 
shoes of the subrogor [the Gourleys] and the third party 
[Erie Insurance Exchange] may properly assert any 
defenses against the subrogee [the Plan] that it would 
normally have against the subrogor [the Gourleys]. 
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfar e Fund v. Phillip 
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir . 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1105 (2000); Puritan Ins. Co. v. Canadian Universal 
Ins. Co., Ltd., 775 F.2d 76 (3d Cir . 1985). 
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Under subrogation law, if a tortfeasor or a tortfeasor's 
insurer settles with an injured party with knowledge of an 
insurer's subrogation rights, the subr ogation rights remain. 
16 Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev. ed.) S 61:201; see also 
generally Gibbs v. Hawaiian Eugenia Corp., 966 F .2d 101, 
106 (2d Cir. 1992). Although a third party may generally 
assert any defense it has against the subrogor to the 
subrogee, this right does not exist when ther e is evidence of 
fraud between the subrogor and the thir d party that is 
intended to defeat the subrogee's rights.15 Wendy's Int'l, Inc. 
v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1014 (6th Cir . 1996) ("The 
[subrogation] doctrine was created to prevent wrongdoers 
from shirking their liability by settling with a subrogor, 
thereby successfully avoiding obligations to a subrogee."). 
When there is evidence of fraud between the subrogor and 
the third party that is intended to defeat subr ogation 
rights, it is inequitable to permit the thir d party to assert 
payment in full as a defense to the subrogee's suit. Wendy's 
Int'l, 94 F.3d at 1014. 
 
Here, there is no evidence of fraud. Erie Insurance 
Exchange settled with the Gourleys for the full amount of 
the uninsured motorist benefits coverage. There is no 
evidence to support the claim that this payment was made 
for the fraudulent purpose of interfering with or prejudicing 
the Plan's right to subrogation.16  The payment of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Although previous applications of this doctrine have generally been 
limited to situations involving a tortfeasor or a tortfeasor's insurance 
company, we believe similar equitable principles apply to Erie as the 
Gourleys' uninsured motorist insurer. See generally Wendy's Int'l,94 
F.3d at 1014. Therefore, we believe it is appropriate to extend this 
doctrine to the facts of this case. See generally Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. 
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 43, 45 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The 
general rule in the United States is that a subr ogee is not limited to 
asserting claims against third party wr ongdoers, but may assert a claim 
against the subrogor's contractual obligor as well."). 
 
16. If an insurance company pays reduced benefits to an insured 
knowing the proceeds will be applied to r eimbursing an ERISA plan for 
benefit payments (i.e. if Erie Insurance Exchange paid less than the 
$141,401.35 the Plan expended for Mr. Gourley's medical expenses even 
though it was required to pay $300,000 under the terms of the 
uninsured motorist plan), the reduced payment may be sufficient to 
support a finding of fraud on the subrogee. 
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$300,000 to the Gourleys does not prevent the Plan from 
recovery since the Plan may still assert its right to the 
proceeds of the Erie Insurance Exchange policy. Because of 
the absence of fraud in the payment of the uninsur ed 
motorist benefits, it is not inequitable to per mit Erie 
Insurance Exchange to assert payment in full in r esponse 
to the Plan's suit. 
 
The District Court properly held Erie Insurance Exchange 
was not liable to reimburse the Plan with the proceeds of 
the Gourleys' uninsured motorist benefit's policy. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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